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SÍNTESE – O estruturalismo alcançou seu zênite
de influência no pensamento francês nos anos 60 e
70 do século XX, quando Lévinas escreveu os seus 
livros mais importantes. Gostaria, portanto, de 
examinar sua concepção das implicações 
filosóficas desta corrente teorético-metodológica,
cujo impacto nas sciences humaines quase não
deixou nenhum pensador francês indiferente na
época. Lévinas acusou o estruturalismo de não
passar de uma ilusão, na medida em que sua 
espontaneidade subjetiva faz com que impulsos e
instintos sejam descritos como valores da razão
prática. Todavia, apesar da divergência entre
Lévinas, para quem a ciência deve estar ao serviço
da ética, e Lévi-Strauss, que concebia a ética no
melhor dos casos como resultado da pesquisa
científica e não como seu fim, ambos pensadores
embasaram sua ética na mesma premissa:
respeitar a alteridade do Outro, de cada pessoa,
cada sociedade e cada cultura. A crítica de Lévinas
não visava a refutação do estruturalismo mas suas
premissas teóricas. Se elas pudessem ser
ratificadas, alguém poderia justificar a metodologia
estruturalista. Portanto, a palavra-chave aqui é
“se”. Sua crítica não é nenhuma negação absoluta.
Sua principal crítica foi a de que o estruturalismo 
era uma teoria científica que não deixava nenhum
lugar para a ética; portanto, Lévinas também
considerava o estruturalismo uma ameaça ao
judaísmo, onde a ética ocupa um importante lugar.
No início do século XX, Rosenzweig – assim como 
Lévinas no seu fim – buscou propor uma saída da
concepção de totalidade porque não deixava lugar
adequado para o estatuto do ser humano como
sujeito. Para Rosenzweig, tratava-se antes de mais
nada de uma revolta contra a filosofia idealista de
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its influence in French thought in the sixties 
and seventies of the 20
th century when Lévinas 
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want to examine his contention with the 
philosophical implications of this theoretical-
methodological current to whose impact on “les 
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subjective spontaneity is no more than an 
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critique was that structuralism was a scientific 
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endeavored to propose an outlet frm the 
conception of totality because it did not leave 
any adequate place for man’s status as a 
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Hegel, enquanto que para Lévinas compreendia
uma crítica do estruturalismo que dava primazia a
estruturas inconscientes sobre a subjetividade
humana. Apenas esta pode servir de base para
uma ética que fosse o propósito maior de sua
filosofia 
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all a revolt against Hegel’s idealistic philosophy,
while for Lévinas it comprised a critique of 
structuralism that awarded priority to 
unconscious structures over human subjectivity. 
Only the latter can serve as a basis for ethics 
which was the chief goal of his philosophy. 
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Structuralism reached the peak of its influence in French thought in the six-
ties and seventies of the 20
th century when Lévinas wrote his most important 
books. Therefore I want to examine his contention with the philosophical implica-
tions of this theoretical-methodological current to whose impact on “les sciences 
humaines” almost no French thinker remained indifferent at the time. Structural-
ism distinguished itself by its methodological uniqueness but also represented an 
epistemological conception that stressed pure theoretical knowledge. It mistrusted 
any inclination to underscore the free will of the human subject. This was charac-
teristic especially of those disciplines that dealt with man
1 as its main subject-
matter and strove to dismiss subjectivity and values from scientific knowledge. 
Lévinas accused structuralism that according to it subjective spontaneity is no 
more than an illusion by which impulses and instincts are described as values of 
practical reason. Rather surprisingly Lévinas linked this critique also with an at-
tack on Spinoza because he presented the desired as valuable instead of the value 
as desirable.
2 He had in mind Spinoza’s assertion “that we do not endeavor, will, 
seek after or desire because we judge a thing to be good. On the contrary, we 
judge a thing to be good because we endeavor, will, seek after and desire it.”
3 
This view led, according to Lévinas, to the subjugation of axiology to desires and 
drives which did not leave any place for the transcendence of human subjectivity. 
Creative comprehension turns into something objective which is based on sole 
logical relations; everything is conceived as structures of an all-encompassing 
system. According to structuralism and contrary to Kant theoretical reason reigns 
supreme.
4 
In the very same years that Lévinas elaborated his ethics of the Other, Claude 
Lévi-Strauss developed his structuralist anthropology which emphasized that one 
ought not consider so-called “primitive” or “savage” cultures as inferior to “our” 
western civilisation, but to conceive of them as others and to respect this other-
ness. It is unnecessary to examine in this paper whether and to which degree 
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Lévinas’ conept of the other was perhaps also influenced by Lévi-Strauss or vice 
versa. Lévinas arrived at his ethical conclusions from metaphysical inquiries while 
Lévi-Strauss came to his ethical statements from ethnological research and con-
sidered them as scientific conclusions. Yet, notwithstanding the divergence be-
tween Lévinas, according to whom science must serve ethics, and Lévi-Strauss, 
according to whom ethics is at most a result of scientific research and not its end, 
both established their ethics on the same assumption: to respect the otherness of 
the other, of every person, every society, every culture. Lévinas mentioned Lévi-
Strauss and Structuralism on several occasions, e.g. when he connected “our 
national literatures” with the folklorisms of “Savage Thought”.
5 He noted, how-
ever, that he never became attached to structuralism, despite his admiration of 
Lévi-Strauss’ speculative power that presented itself as scientific empiricism.
6 
Lévinas did not write any special essays on Structuralism, but he also did not 
restrict himself to mere sporadic responses. He performed a thorough analysis of 
several philosophical assumptions of Structuralism, in order to confront them with 
his own philosophical views. His criticism did not aim at refuting structuralism but 
wrestled with some of its theoretical assumptions. If they were possible of ratifica-
tion, one might justify structuralist methodology. So the keyword is “if”. His critique 
is no absolute denial. His main critical reaction to Structuralism one can find in 
Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence.
7 So what were those structuralist as-
sumptions or presuppositions that aroused Lévinas’ resentment? They did not so 
much consist in a disagreement with certain thinkers or books, but in a refutation of 
structuralism as a pretentious scientific current. He was less suspicious of its meth-
odological aspects than of its theoretical and philosophical pretensions and implica-
tions. Lévinas’ critique was turned against the tendency of generalization and totali-
zation, but he did not hesitate to employ from time to timesome kind of structuralist 
hermeneutics, e.g. in his Talmudic lectures. He also took avail quite often of the 
distinction between diachronic and synchronic which pervaded structuralist re-
search since de Saussure and was one of its distinctive features. When he spoke 
about the “being” (être) of “beings” (étants), he presupposed the presence or possi-
ble presence of the “beings”, which obviously implicated a synchronic approach. He 
agreed that simultaneous relations can be investigated most advantageously by 
structuralist methodology. But on the whole Lévinas denied the synchronic method 
of structuralism because it ignored the streaming of time and because it tried to 
establish a spacial system whose components have no before or after.
8 This is quite 
surprising because Jewish traditional thought emphasized that “there is no earlier or 
later in the Torah”.
9 
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Lévinas referred very rarely to the important distinction of de Saussure be-
tween “language” (langue) and “speech” (parole) which became one of the main 
methodological paradigms of structuralism. He appreciated several thoughts of 
Michel Foucault, the most philosophical thinker among the structuralists and 
post-structuralists. Like Foucault his goal was less the research of the historical 
events themselves but their manifestation in written language (archives etc.). 
Lévinas underscored, certainly also under the influence of the Jewish distinction 
between the oral Torah and the written Torah, between spontaneous expres-
sions (speech, utterances) and their permanent contents. These contents may 
remind one of what Foucault characterized as “archivist features” of the “dis-
course”; they alone are, according to Foucault, of true scientific signification. 
Perhaps one can detect in Lévinas’ distinction between the oral and the written 
Torah also a certain echo of de Saussure’s distinction between “speech” and 
“language” which we may rediscover also in Lévinas’ distinction between “Dire” 
(saying) and “Dit” (said). 
In this connection one can discover some interesting influence of Lévinas on 
Derrida: De Saussure emphasized the distinction between language and speech; 
Foucault, and in his wake Lévinas, stressed the distinction between speech and 
written texts, and Derrida highlighted the priority of writing (“écriture”) to 
speech. However, Derrida did not come to the issues of speech and writing that 
occupied a very important place in his thought, from Foucault but, among   
others, from none other than Lévinas. But these structuralist traces in Lévinas’ 
thought were blurred by his caustic critique of structuralism as clashing with his 
conception of ethics and the humanities. His critique derived from three main 
arguments: 
I. Structuralism was a scientific theory which left no place for the subject. The 
same critique was raised also by the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. Lévinas 
defined this structuralist position as “théorisme”. Thought becomes anonymous; 
language replaces the speaker and is conceived as a formal system of signs. This 
contradicts the personalism which is characteristic of Lévinas’ thought. Man and 
God are persons, subjects; on this point he does not make any concessions. The 
structuralists disregarded man as a subject – Foucault spoke about the “death of 
man” and L. Althusser about “theoretical anti-humanism”, J. Lacan underesti-
mated the human person in his idiosyncratic version of psychoanalysis, and even 
Lévi-Strauss did so to a certain degree when he described man as a member of a 
system of structures, unbeknown to him. As against them Lévinas stressed the 
humanist message of man’s relation to the other (“autrui”) which drew its inspira-
tion also from Jewish sources. Instead of such objective structuralist trends Lévi-
nas underscored the subjective notion of “non-indifférence” to the other man in his 
ethics.   65
Like Ricoeur Lévinas appreciated Lévi-Strauss’ work, but although he employed 
some structuralist methodology in his Talmudic lectures, he stated explicitly that it 
seems inapplicable to the Talmud. The reference of the Talmud to the Torah is very 
different from the “bricolage” in “Savage Thought”.
10 There is, however, a certain lapse 
in this statement, because the Talmud belongs to a historical epoch while what Lévi-
Strauss characterized as “savage thought” pertained to a pre-historic age which had 
not yet acquired the art of writing. Although the Jewish tradition refers to the Talmud 
as the “oral Tora”, as against the Torah which is known as the “written Torah”, all the 
Talmudic tractates, including their interpretations, were fully written texts. Lévinas 
therefore interpreted Lévi-Strauss’ concept of “savage thought” incorrectly. His rhe-
torical question whether one can compare Einstein’s scientific intellect with “savage 
thought”,
11 missed the point. Lévi-Strauss did not deal with exceptional geniuses, but 
asserted that the mental and logical capacities of “savages” are not inferior to those of 
western “cultured” persons. He rejected L. Lévy-Bruhl’s assumption of “pre-logical” or 
“primitive” mentality. By the way, Lévinas wrote a rather sympathetic article on the 
philosophical implications of Levy-Bruhl’s view.
12 Yet Lévi-Strauss’ ethical implications 
are closer to Lévinas’ ethics than he thought (vide supra). 
II. Foucault very often used indefinite expressions like “on” (which has no exact 
English counterpart, perhaps “somebody”) and “il y a” (“there is”) that do not refer 
to any special subject.
13 According to Lévinas these expressions imply that 
anonymous forces fulfill the same role which religion accorded to God and human-
ism to Man. An utterance such as “il pleut” (“it rains”) contradicts the traditional 
religious belief of Judaism that it is God who brings down rain. Lévinas asserted 
that on or il y a, notwithstanding the important place of ther latter term in Lévinas’ 
philosophy, cannot express ethical responsibility. There also is no true passage 
from structuralist “théorisme” to ethics. On this point there is at first sight a para-
doxical accord between structuralist thinkers on the one hand and Lévinas on the 
other. The first excluded ethics from structuralist theory on account of its allegedly 
non-scientific nature, while Lévinas rejected structuralist theory because it ex-
cluded ethics from scientific thought. Therefore he considered structuralism to be 
a danger to Judaism where ethics occupies a very important place. 
Modern atheism is not merely negation of God. It is the absolute indifference of Tristes 
Tropiques. I think that it is the most atheistic book, written in our time, the absolutely 
disoriented and disorienting book. It is a menace to Judaism as well as to the Hegelian 
and sociological vision of history… In France, Judaism … is troubled by three Jews, by 
three grand oeuvres: by Eric Weil, by Raymond Aron and by Lévi-Strauss.
14 
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This severe accusation of one of Lévi-Strauss’ most beautiful books, imbibed 
with humanism, that regards the other man – in this case the “wild” Indians in the 
jungles of Brasil who are at first sight estranged to our western cultural heritage – 
as intellectually equal to us, is incomprehensible and inacceptable. Perhaps this 
unjust evaluation was caused by Lévinas’ annoyance that these three Jews, out-
standing personages in the intellectual life of France, did not show any interest in 
their Jewish heritage. Although on several occasions Lévi-Strauss and Lévinas 
expressed their mutual admiration, on the philosophical plane they remained un-
compromising adversaries. 
III. Structuralism considers contents to be secondary to the formal relations that 
compose the scientific structures. As against that, in the phenomenology of 
Husserl (which had also been a source of inspiration for Lévi-Strauss), in Heideg-
ger’s philosophy and in existentialist thought which all three served as points of 
departure for Lévinas’ philosophy, the contents were the decisive element, al-
though Heidegger’s philosophy remained indifferent to ethics which aroused Lévi-
nas’ strong critique.. While structuralist methodology leans mainly on a formalist 
basis, Lévinas endeavors to arrive at “de-formalization”. 
It is not surprising that Jacques Derrida, in his first great essay on Lévinas,
15 
did not wrestle with him in the spirit of structuralism but in the spirit of the intel-
lectual tradition of western thought whose origin was Greek philosophy. Also 
Lévinas when he criticized the Greek tradition in favor of the Hebrew tradition, 
employed Greek terms. According to Derrida this ought indeed to be so. Therefore 
he defended, in “Violence and Metaphysics”, the “Greek” Husserl and Heidegger 
against Lévinas’ objections. He rejected several ideas that were in the centre of 
Lévinas’ thought on these matters: the preference of ethics to ontology, the con-
cept of the radical Other. Derrida based his critique of Lévinas’ metaphysics on 
the concept of “common sense”, not in the prevalent connotation of Anglo-Saxon 
philosophy but in the spirit of phenomenology which served as a common de-
nominator of the beginnings of the philosophizing of both of them. 
In the past most philosophers were convinced that consciousness reaches 
truth by way of thought, but Hegel already dissociated himself from that view and 
put into question Descartes’ Cogito. Likewise modern philosophy is suspicious of 
supposedly immediate constituents of consciousness. This gave birth to that de-
personalization which Lévinas denounced in structuralist theory. Living man, man 
as a conscious subject, disappeared, as it were, behind an abstract system of 
structures, conceived by formal-mathematical methods. Not man thinks the struc-
tures, but the structures think themselves. In this manner Lévi-Strauss asserted: 
“We are not, therefore, claiming to show how men think the myths, but rather 
how the myths think themselves out in men and without men’s knowledge.”
16 
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According to the structuralist, human subjectivity is no more than an illusion. 
Even the most thoughtful scholars or philosophers are guided ultimately by un-
conscious cognitive interests; their thought reflects what Lévi-Strauss called “the 
collective unconscious”. Non-personal theory suppresses praxis. These theoretical 
implications of structuralism were repudiated by Lévinas. 
Unconscious influences and motives disguise or conceal man’s true image, 
but they cannot suspend his ineffability as man which is embodied in man’s “un-
egoistical non-interestedness”.
17 This is man’s sanctity. Availing himself of the 
metaphysics of contradictions which he was always very fond of, according to 
which the same and the other are identical (an idea which he will disclaim later), 
Lévinas asserted: “Paradoxalement, c’est en tant qu’aliénus – étranger et autre – 
que l’homme n’est plus aliéné.”
18 Thus he tried to lay the foundations for a new 
humanism which he defined – this was also the title of his book of 1972 – human-
ism of the other man (this analysis does not necessarily conform to the chronologi-
cal order of Lévinas’ and Derrida’s books). The chief innovation in Lévinas’ con-
cept of humanism was manifested by his passage from ontological studies to eth-
ics. He repudiated the exclusively ontological dimension in Heidegger’s philoso-
phy which left no place for ethics. Man must exert oneself, in order to transcend 
beyond (au-delà) his given ontological status by creating a relation to the other, 
namely by a real contact. Here one can detect undoubtedly some affinity to ideas 
of Buber and Rosenzweig, although he criticized their conception of similarity 
between the I and the other and stressed their dissimilarity by giving priority to 
the other over the I; he also disapproved of their dialogical conception of the God-
head that clashed with his view of God’s absolute transcendence which he ex-
pressed by the neologism “illéité”. However, like Rosenzweig who employed the 
language of the “old thinking” of Hegelian idealism, in order to achieve his “new 
thinking” (“Das neue Denken”), so did Lévinas when he discarded ontology by 
availing himself of its terminology. 
When he discussed, e.g., the concept of truth, one can distinguish also some 
indirect traces of structuralist concepts. Concealing truth, i. e. hiding the truth of 
beings (êtres), is not merely an optical matter, namely that they are not revealed to 
the eye. Beings are endowed with some kind of “co-présence” one against an-
other; their mutual relations are embodied in a system of significations whose 
truthfulness is manifested by their structures. However, when these beings are 
conceived outside their structural relations, they are concealed by a certain 
shadow. Revealing their structure makes possible to elicit the intelligibility and 
signification that cannot be discovered, as long as their components are conceived 
separately. Then they have no more than the meaning which language bestows on 
them. Therefore one can distinguish between things that are separate intelligibles 
from the point of view of their subject-matter and the intelligibility of the structural 
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system itself.
19 From this angle also subjectivity is subordinated to structural ar-
rangements. It can be defined as rational theoretical consciousness, what we 
designate as “esprit”, briefly “l’intelligibilité signifie, tout autant que la 
manifestation, l’arrangement en système où signifient les étants”.
20 It is, however, 
quite difficult to understand what Lévinas had in mind in this passage. 
Many terms that several decades ago fulfilled an important role in contempo-
rary French philosophy - “destruction”,  “deconstruction”,  “unsaying” ( dédire), 
“rupture” (coupure), “transcendence”, “différence”, “différance”, “résistance” etc. 
– indicate some negative connotation, and even at some verbal violence. More-
over, the prefix “de” reigns, as it w ere, supreme: deconstruction, decentering, 
disappearance, dissemination (the title of one of Derrida’s most importnt books), 
demythisation, demythologization (the chief concept of R. Bultmann’s theology), 
demystification (Lévinas), discontinuity, difference, differance (Derrida) and so on. 
All these words, most of which we encounter in Lévinas’ writings, and still more 
in Derrida’s, reflect the recoil from abstract totalities. They express an atmosphere 
of instability, an all-pervading amorphous milieu. In modern Jewish thought this 
recoil from totalization was expressed by Franz Rosenzweig; it left its strong im-
pact on Lévinas. It is, however, important to note that Rosenzweig in the begin-
ning of the 20
th century as well as Lévinas at its end endeavored to propose an 
outlet frm the conception of totality which did not leave an adequate place for 
man’s status as a subject (vide supra). For Rosenzweig that had been first of all a 
revolt against Hegel’s idealistic philosophy, while for Lévinas it also comprised a 
critique of structuralism that awarded priority to unconscious structures over hu-
man subjectivity. Only the latter can serve as a basis for ethics which was the 
chief goal of his philosophy. 
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